

Lightweight static capabilities

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Goals

- ▶ Safety
 - ▶ no buffer overflow
 - ▶ modular arithmetic
- ▶ Performance (minimal runtime checking)
- ▶ Static assurance
- ▶ Available now
 - ▶ languages (Haskell, OCaml)
 - ▶ tools (compilers, debuggers)
 - ▶ features (IO, general recursion, mutation)
 - ▶ algorithms (Knuth-Morris-Pratt string search)

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```
bsearch cmp arr key = brand arr (\arr ->
  let rec loop i k = compare i k None (\i' k' ->
    let j = middle i' k' and x = get arr j in
    case cmp x key of LT -> loop (succ j) k
                          EQ -> Just (unbi j, x)
                          GT -> loop i (pred j))
      in loop)
```

Static capabilities

Continuum of correctness

- ▶ Assure safety properties, not full correctness
- ▶ Extend trust from small kernel to large sandbox

System requirements

- ▶ Higher-rank polymorphism
- ▶ Phantom types instead of dependent types

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- ▶ Higher-rank polymorphism
- ▶ Phantom types instead of dependent types

A *capability* authorizes access to a protected object and certifies that a safety condition holds.

Outline

Trivial example: Empty-list checking

List reverse

Abstract data type to witness a runtime invariant

Formalization: putting data constructors to work

Main example: Array-bounds checking

Binary search

Higher-rank polymorphism for an infinite family of invariants

Formalization: lightweight dependent typing

List reverse

Starting point: ensure safety by *redundant* runtime checks.

```
rev l acc = if null l then acc  
            else rev (tail l) (cons (head l) acc)
```

Idea: record the result of `null` check by wrapping the list type.

```
newtype List+ a = Nonempty (List a)
```

Runtime check supplies certifying witness to continuation.

```
indeed :: List a -> w -> (List+ a -> w)  
head   :: List+ a -> a  
tail   :: List+ a -> List a
```

Now `head` and `tail` need not check safety—

```
rev l acc = indeed l acc  
           (\l -> rev (tail l) (cons (head l) acc))
```

—as long as `Nonempty` does not wrap an empty list.

Abstract data type to witness a runtime invariant

Use Milner's idea in LCF/ML:

- ▶ Divide the program into a small *security kernel* and a large *client sandbox*.

```
module Kernel
(
    List, List+,
    nil, cons,
    indeed, head, tail
)
where ...
```

- ▶ Using a module or namespace system, ensure that only the security kernel may apply the data constructor Nonempty.

Formalize security as an invariant of an abstract data type.

System F

Metavariables

Term variables x, y, z

Terms E

Type variables s, t

Types N, T, W

Natural numbers m, n

System F

Metavariables

Term variables x, y, z

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Types N, T, W

Natural numbers m, n

$[t : \star]$

\vdots

$$\frac{T : \star \quad T' : \star}{T \rightarrow T' : \star}$$

$$\frac{\quad \quad \quad T' : \star}{\forall t. T' : \star}$$

$[x : T]$

\vdots

$[t : \star]$

\vdots

$$\frac{T : \star \quad E : T'}{\lambda x. E : T \rightarrow T'} \quad \frac{E_1 : T \rightarrow T' \quad E_2 : T}{E_1 E_2 : T'}$$

$$\frac{E : T'}{\text{At}. E : \forall t. T'} \quad \frac{E : \forall t. T' \quad T : \star}{ET : T' \{t \mapsto T\}}$$

Putting data constructors to work

$$\frac{T : \star}{\text{List } T : \star}$$

$$\frac{T : \star}{\text{List}^+ T : \star}$$

$$\frac{}{\text{Int} : \star}$$

$$\frac{T : \star \quad E_1 : T \quad E_2 : \text{List } T}{\text{nil} : \text{List } T \quad E_1 :: E_2 : \text{List } T} \quad \frac{E_1 : T \quad E_2 : \text{List } T}{\text{nonempty} (E_1 :: E_2) : \text{List}^+ T} \quad \frac{}{n : \text{Int}}$$

$$\frac{E : \text{List } T \quad E_1 : W \quad E_2 : \text{List}^+ T \rightarrow W}{\text{indeed } EE_1 E_2 : W} \quad \frac{E : \text{List}^+ T}{\text{head } E : T} \quad \frac{E : \text{List}^+ T}{\text{tail } E : \text{List } T}$$

Putting data constructors to work

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Small-step operational semantics


$$\frac{\vdots \quad \vdots}{5 :: 7 :: \text{nil} : \text{List Int} \quad \overline{0 : \text{Int}} \quad \lambda x. \text{head } x : \text{List}^+ \text{ Int} \rightarrow \text{Int}}{\text{indeed } (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) 0 (\lambda x. \text{head } x) : \text{Int}}$$

transition

$$\frac{\vdots \quad \vdots}{\lambda x. \text{head } x : \text{List}^+ \text{ Int} \rightarrow \text{Int} \quad \overline{\text{nonempty } (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) : \text{List}^+ \text{ Int}}}{(\lambda x. \text{head } x)(\text{nonempty } (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil})) : \text{Int}}$$


Formalization

Small-step semantics (\downarrow) with syntax-directed translation (\rightarrow)



Formalization

Small-step semantics (\downarrow) with syntax-directed translation (\rightarrow)



Relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and transitions*. To prove:

- ▶ The kernel is implemented in Lax as specified in Strict.
- ▶ The sandbox constructs are identical in Lax and in Strict.

Formalization

Small-step semantics (\Downarrow) with syntax-directed translation (\rightarrow)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \textbf{Strict} & & \textbf{Lax} \\ \text{indeed } (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil})\ 0 & \xrightarrow{\textit{relax}} & (\lambda xyz. \dots) (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil})\ 0 \\ (\lambda x. \text{head}\ x) & & (\lambda x. (\lambda x. \dots) x) \end{array}$$

We call a Lax program *sandboxed* if it uses kernel constructs only by inlining the kernel implementation.

Extend trust from kernel to sandbox

- ▶ Relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and transitions*.
- ▶ Every (well-typed) sandboxed Lax program is the relaxation of some (well-typed) Strict program.
- ▶ Strict enjoys progress and preservation: well-typed Strict code does not go wrong.

Hence, well-typed sandboxed Lax code does not go wrong.

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Formalization: lightweight dependent typing

Lightweight dependent typing

$$\begin{array}{c} \frac{}{\bar{n} : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star \quad T : \star}{\text{List}^N T : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}^N : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}_{\text{L}}^N : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}_{\text{H}}^N : \star} \\ \\ \frac{E_1 : T \quad \dots \quad E_n : T}{\text{array } E_1 :: \dots :: E_n :: \text{nil} : \text{List}^{\bar{n}} T} \quad \frac{1 \leq m \leq n}{m_{\text{I}} : \text{Int}^{\bar{n}}} \quad \frac{1 \leq m}{m_{\text{L}} : \text{Int}_{\text{L}}^{\bar{n}}} \quad \frac{m \leq n}{m_{\text{H}} : \text{Int}_{\text{H}}^{\bar{n}}} \\ \\ \frac{E : \text{List } T \quad E' : \forall s. \text{List}^s T \rightarrow \text{Int}_{\text{L}}^s \rightarrow \text{Int}_{\text{H}}^s \rightarrow W}{\text{brand } EE' : W} \quad \frac{E_1 : \text{List}^N T \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N}{\text{get } E_1 E_2 : T} \\ \\ \frac{E_{\text{L}} : \text{Int}_{\text{L}}^N \quad E_{\text{H}} : \text{Int}_{\text{H}}^N \quad E_1 : W \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N \rightarrow \text{Int}^N \rightarrow W}{\text{compare } E_{\text{L}} E_{\text{H}} E_1 E_2 : W} \\ \\ \frac{E_1 : \text{Int}^N \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N}{\text{middle } E_1 E_2 : \text{Int}^N} \quad \frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{succ } E : \text{Int}_{\text{L}}^N} \quad \frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{pred } E : \text{Int}_{\text{H}}^N} \quad \frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{unbi } E : \text{Int}} \end{array}$$

Lightweight dependent typing

$$\frac{}{\bar{n} : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star \quad T : \star}{\text{List}^N T : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}^N : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}_L^N : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}_H^N : \star}$$
$$\frac{E_1 : T \quad \dots \quad E_n : T}{\text{array } E_1 :: \dots :: E_n :: \text{nil} : \text{List}^{\bar{n}} T} \quad \frac{1 \leq m \leq n}{m_I : \text{Int}^{\bar{n}}} \quad \frac{1 \leq m}{m_L : \text{Int}_L^{\bar{n}}} \quad \frac{m \leq n}{m_H : \text{Int}_H^{\bar{n}}}$$
$$\frac{E : \text{List } T \quad E' : \forall s. \text{List}^s T \rightarrow \text{Int}_L^s \rightarrow \text{Int}_H^s \rightarrow W}{\text{brand } EE' : W} \quad \frac{E_1 : \text{List}^N T \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N}{\text{get } E_1 E_2 : T}$$
$$\frac{E_L : \text{Int}_L^N \quad E_H : \text{Int}_H^N \quad E_1 : W \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N \rightarrow \text{Int}^N \rightarrow W}{\text{compare } E_L E_H E_1 E_2 : W}$$
$$\frac{E_1 : \text{Int}^N \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N}{\text{middle } E_1 E_2 : \text{Int}^N} \quad \frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{succ } E : \text{Int}_L^N} \quad \frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{pred } E : \text{Int}_H^N} \quad \frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{unbi } E : \text{Int}}$$

Small-step operational semantics

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \Lambda s. \lambda xyz. \text{compare } yz \ 0 \ \lambda yz. \text{get } x \ (\text{middle } yz) \\ 5 :: 7 :: \text{nil} : \text{List Int} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ : \forall s. \text{List}^s \text{ Int} \rightarrow \text{Int}_L^s \rightarrow \text{Int}_H^s \rightarrow \text{Int} \end{array}}{\text{brand} (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) \ \Lambda s. \lambda xyz. \text{compare } yz \ 0 \ \lambda yz. \text{get } x \ (\text{middle } yz) : \text{Int}}$$
$$(\Lambda s. \lambda xyz. \text{compare } yz \ 0 \ \lambda yz. \text{get } x \ (\text{middle } yz)) \bar{2} (\text{array} \ 5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) \ 1_L \ 2_H$$
$$\downarrow$$
$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \text{array} \ 5 :: 7 :: \text{nil} : \text{List}^{\bar{2}} \text{ Int} \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} 1 \leq 1 \leq 2 \\ \hline 1_I : \text{Int}^{\bar{2}} \end{array}}{\text{get} (\text{array} \ 5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) \ 1_I : \text{Int}}$$

Lightweight dependent typing

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{\bar{n} : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star \quad T : \star}{\text{List}^N T : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}^N : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}_L^N : \star} \quad \frac{N : \star}{\text{Int}_H^N : \star} \\
 \\[10pt]
 \frac{E_1 : T \quad \dots \quad E_n : T}{\text{array } E_1 :: \dots :: E_n :: \text{nil} : \text{List}^{\bar{n}} T} \quad \frac{1 \leq m \leq n}{m_I : \text{Int}^{\bar{n}}} \quad \frac{1 \leq m}{m_L : \text{Int}_L^{\bar{n}}} \quad \frac{m \leq n}{m_H : \text{Int}_H^{\bar{n}}} \\
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 \end{array}$$

Lightweight dependent typing

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dependent types (Martin-Löf, Dybjer, ...)

singleton types (Hayashi, Xi, Stone, ...)

phantom types (... , Fluet & Pucella, ...)

reflecting values through types (Thurston, Kiselyov & Shan, ...)

$$\text{brand } E E' : W \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{get } E_1 E_2 : T$$

$$\frac{E_L : \text{Int}_L^N \quad E_H : \text{Int}_H^N \quad E_1 : W \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N \rightarrow \text{Int}^N \rightarrow W}{\text{compare } E_L E_H E_1 E_2 : W}$$

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Putting more data constructors to work

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Memory locations as term constants (Morrisett et al., Moggi & Sabry)

$$\text{brand } EE' : W \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{get } E_1 E_2 : T$$

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Nonces in security protocols

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Ill-typed term: $\text{brand } (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) \Lambda s. \lambda xyz. \text{get } x 1_I \xrightarrow{\text{t}^N \rightarrow W}$
 (Can't open branded lock with unbranded key)

$$\frac{E_1 : \text{Int}^N \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N}{\text{middle } E_1 E_2 : \text{Int}^N}$$

$$\frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{succ } E : \text{Int}_L^N}$$

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Rights amplification

$$\frac{}{\bar{n} : \star}$$

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With rights amplification, the authority accessible from bringing two references together can exceed the sum of authorities provided by each individually. The classic example is the can and the can-opener—only by bringing the two together do we obtain the food in the can.

—Miller et al.

$$\text{middle } E_1 E_2 : \text{int}$$

$$\text{succ } E : \text{int}_L$$

$$\frac{: \text{Int}^N}{\text{pred } E : \text{Int}_H^N}$$


$$\frac{E : \text{Int}^N}{\text{unbi } E : \text{Int}}$$

$$\frac{E_1 : \text{List}^N T \quad E_2 : \text{Int}^N}{\text{get } E_1 E_2 : T}$$

$$\frac{\text{it}^N \rightarrow \text{Int}^N \rightarrow W}{W}$$


Formalization

Small-step semantics (\Downarrow) with syntax-directed translation (\rightarrow)



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Small-step semantics (\downarrow) with syntax-directed translation (\rightarrow)



Relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and transitions*. To prove:

- ▶ The kernel is implemented in Lax as specified in Strict.
- ▶ The sandbox constructs are identical in Lax and in Strict.

Formalization

Small-step semantics (\Downarrow) with syntax-directed translation (\rightarrow)

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \textbf{Strict} & & \textbf{Lax} \\ \text{brand } (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) E & \xrightarrow{\textit{relax}} & (\lambda xy. y\tau(\text{array } x) 1_L | x |_H) \\ & & (5 :: 7 :: \text{nil}) E \end{array}$$

We call a Lax program *sandboxed* if it uses kernel constructs only by inlining the kernel implementation.

Extend trust from kernel to sandbox

- ▶ Relaxation preserves typing, valuehood, and transitions*.
- ▶ Every (well-typed) sandboxed Lax program is the relaxation of some (well-typed) Strict program.
- ▶ Strict enjoys progress and preservation: well-typed Strict code does not go wrong.

Hence, well-typed sandboxed Lax code does not go wrong.

Twelf mechanization

Theorem (Progress)

Every well-typed term either is a value or transitions to another term.

Proof.

By induction on evaluation contexts. □

Twelf mechanization

Lemma

A value never has any type of the form $\text{Int}^{T \rightarrow T'}$.

Proof.

There is only one case, the value nil. □

Theorem (Progress)

Every well-typed term either is a value or transitions to another term.

Proof.

By induction on evaluation contexts. □

Twelf mechanization

Lemma

The expression nil never has any type of the form Int^T .

Proof.

There are no cases. □

Lemma

A value never has any type of the form $\text{Int}^{T \rightarrow T'}$.

Proof.

There is only one case, the value nil. □

Theorem (Progress)

Every well-typed term either is a value or transitions to another term.

Proof.

By induction on evaluation contexts. □

Summary

A concrete, rigorous, practical framework for extending trust from a small kernel to a large program

Available now

- ▶ Type proxies for values, instead of dependent types
- ▶ Download all code online, with more substantial examples
 - ▶ Folding over multiple arrays of various sizes
 - ▶ Knuth-Morris-Pratt string search

Easy to verify small kernel

- ▶ Prove progress and preservation for specification
- ▶ Prove implementation corresponds to specification

Ongoing work

- ▶ More examples (any suggestions?)
- ▶ Characterize lightweight dependent typing