

## Agreeably Astray: Imagination and Music

As Gregory Currie observes, “recent, analytically framed, discussions of the concept of art rarely mention imagination as one of its constituents.”<sup>1</sup> Today, picking up two very recent and highly respected introductions to philosophy of art, I find no entry for ‘imagination’ in either index.<sup>2</sup> Currie is at the fore of movement to restore imagination’s relevance to the arts. However, like most philosophers currently discussing the topic, he focuses on fictional narratives.<sup>3</sup> My topic is somewhat different. I propose that some puzzling features of music listening can be explained by the so-called cognitive theory of imaginative processing.

Until recently, a sizable literature addressed music and imagination.<sup>4</sup> Today, examining a wide range of recent books on philosophy of music, one will have a difficult time finding one that includes the term “imagination” in its subject index.<sup>5</sup> Roger Scruton and Kendall Walton are almost alone in discussing the topic.<sup>6</sup> I propose to combine some of their insights with recent accounts of content-imagining. However, in recasting the thesis in light of cognitive models of imaginative listening, we must take care not assume that we are explaining the capacity to appreciate fictional narratives. A great deal of instrumental music, so-called “pure” music, does not involve such narrative.

Stripped of its contemporary language of cognitive processes, my analysis is actually an updating—and thus rehabilitation—of two proposals advanced in Edaurd Hanslick’s nineteenth-century classic, *On Musical Beauty*. Hanslick’s work is best remembered, of course, for his attack on Romanticism and expression theory. However, I’m not interested in his attacks on Romantic platitudes about music. I am interested in

his positive theory. Working within the obvious Kantian framework, Hanslick constructs his positive account of music experience around the three concepts of imagination, beauty, and pleasure. Hanslick defends a strict formalism by connecting musical “satisfaction” with imagination:

The most significant factor in the mental process which accompanies the comprehending of a musical work and makes it enjoyable will most frequently be overlooked. It is the mental satisfaction which the listener finds in continuously following and anticipating the composer’s designs, here to be confirmed in his expectations, there to be agreeably led astray ... which could quite properly be called a musing of the imagination.<sup>7</sup>

However, two problems with Hanslick’s formulation bother me. First, it is not clear that Hanslick is really talking about imagination. The topic is so poorly delineated that it is unclear why we employ imagination to follow and anticipate musical form. However, Hanslick’s own distinction between literal and metaphorical descriptions of musical form anticipates the solution: music listening requires imagination in the process of hearing music as *moving* forms: “the content of music is tonally *moving* forms.”<sup>8</sup> As Scruton observes, our perception of musical space and musical motion in an auditory sequence—in something that is not actually moving—is a case of imaginative perception. Describing this imaginative perception to one another, all known cultures appeal to the indispensable metaphor of musical motion. As opposed to hearing sequences of sounds, musical content arises “when unreal movement is heard in imaginary space.”<sup>9</sup> As I’ll subsequently argue, this point must not be treated as a thesis about perceptual illusion.

The second problem is that it is unclear how we get pleasure from music that we know well, for which it does not seem plausible to say that we are “agreeably led astray.” For example, it is claimed that music “ceases to be music” once listeners “know and can anticipate” exactly what will occur in the music.<sup>10</sup> However, I think that the familiarity problem vanishes when we treat imagination as non-imagistic, nondoxastic cognition. (This cognition is nondoxastic because it is distinguished from belief.) A great advantage of cognitive accounts of imagination is that we do not presuppose some of the mental activity that is traditionally associated with imagination, particularly mental imagery. As such, I’ll argue that this account of non-imagistic imagination provides an account of how we are agreeably led astray even when we hear music that we know quite well, for which there seems no possibility of being led astray. In other words, accounts of imagination derived from cognitive science provide considerable vindication for the positive argument of Hanslick’s music aesthetics.

As the two terms “image” and “imagine” attest, an account that ignores mental imagery contradicts centuries of wisdom. Dreams are attributed to imagination, the reading of a novel is an imaginative experience, and a tune that gets stuck “in your head” is imagined rather than heard. The latter example confirms that we are capable of imaginative recreation of music already heard. There is also imagining in advance of hearing, as when composers imagine how a musical score will sound when performed.<sup>11</sup> But I will focus on occurrent imagining, that is, imagining that actually takes place *while* hearing music. Is it really necessary for the experience of music? It remains doubtful so long as imagination is construed as requiring mental imagery. By recognizing that non-

imagistic, nondoxastic cognitivism is a mode of imagination, we can see that imagination can be necessary even when auditory imagery is not required.

To be explicitly clear: there are multiple ways to engage imaginatively with music. I do not want to deny that many people engage imaginatively with music by experiencing visual images. Personally, I sometimes “see” three-dimensional shapes in motion. Many composers create a visual image of the score that would accompany the music.<sup>12</sup> Some people propose that experiencing expressive properties requires imagining a human persona that is acting through the music, or that we unconsciously interpret the sounds under some other anthropomorphism, for instance as a human gesture or person in motion.<sup>13</sup>

Furthermore, some music calls for imaginative engagement because it is representational, and this may be the bulk of the music we encounter. However, the important case, as Hanslick recognizes, is absolute music—instrumental music without any title or associated text to guide audience interpretation.<sup>14</sup> Does music require imagination even when it does not involve representation?

Listening to instrumental music, we remember and we anticipate patterns of musical motion. However, it is not at all clear that we constantly construct an *image* of what we will subsequently hear, and compare that image with the sounds we perceive. Mental images are one mode of imagining, but cognitive psychology strongly suggests that mental images are not the whole story.<sup>15</sup> Imagining by means of images is a specialized species of this activity, rather than a defining property of imagination.

Here, then, is a very brief overview of imagination as non-imagistic, nondoxastic cognitivism. Its roots are in cognitive psychology’s recent attempts to understand how

children coordinate imaginative play or pretence in advance of developing an elaborate theory of how other minds operate. Very young children can anticipate how others will interpret their spontaneous pretences, permitting them to engage cooperatively with others in elaborate pretences despite minimal prior scene setting. How do children navigate make-believe so successfully? The solution offered by recent cognitive science is that non-voluntary information processing that underlies belief-formation is isomorphic with imaginative processing, that is to say, with the processing of pretence or make-believe. In other words, recent findings in cognitive psychology solve the problem by explaining how make-believe exploits ordinary cognitive processing. This is a minimalist approach, attributing nothing to imagination beyond the core idea of the ability to take selected thoughts “off line,” identifying them as pretence and thus allowing us to “entertain” and explore thoughts without actually believing them.<sup>16</sup> In the same way that adding one belief to our doxastic system will lead to the formation of additional tacit or occurrent beliefs, entertaining one pretence or nondoxastic cognition will lead to formation of additional ones. Once we engage cognitively, we have limited control over our own cognitive processes.

My argument relies on examples where listeners cannot help but be surprised by a musical design and therefore experience surprise despite their full knowledge of what will happen. It is easy to explain how we can be surprised by familiar music if we allow that our imaginations can be surprised.<sup>17</sup> Listeners will only respond to these musical designs in the manner that composers intend for them to respond if they employ occurrent nondoxastic cognition or, in other words, non-imagistic imagination. These situations offer us a glimpse into the cognitive processes at work throughout the listening

experience, including all the times when the music conforms to our nondoxastic anticipations. However, it will be useful to explain this proposal with a non-musical example.

To say that one imagines in the minimal sense of nondoxastic cognition means that one entertains thoughts without believing them. To see that imagining employs the same cognitive processes that are essential to belief formation, consider this very simple case. Suppose you know that there is no milk in the refrigerator, for you finished it when you had a glass of warm milk before bedtime. Suppose that you and I are the only people with access to your refrigerator. When you awaken eight hours later and open the refrigerator, you discover a full carton of milk. How did the milk get there? Suppose you are sure that you slept soundly—you did not go out and get the milk. In the absence of beliefs about magical milk, you *infer* that someone has brought milk into the house in the intervening eight hours. If you have accepted the supposition that I am the only person with access to the refrigerator, you will now propose that I brought the milk.

Notice that this example involves imagined milk. I asked you to imagine having warm milk, which may be something you never do. It asked you to suppose that only the two of us have access to the refrigerator. The example illustrates the point that after we grasp an initial scenario, our exploration of the imagined scenario employs the same inferential processes that guide real life belief formation. Imaginative processing is isomorphic with ordinary doxastic processes. Yet my instruction to imagine something does not make you lose sight of what you really believe. The imagined scenario that led you to imagine that I put milk in your refrigerator does not lead you to look there for a new carton of milk. Although the thought-processing in the pretense requires premises

drawn from actual beliefs about milk, refrigerators, and so on, very few people lose sight of the line separating what is actually believed from what is only imagined.<sup>18</sup>

In the case just given, all the prompts are verbal. However, some of our most active and complex imaginings are guided by real objects. Our imaginings respond to ongoing perception of the objects that organize our pretence. These perceived objects include toys, props, and visual images. Suppose two five-year-olds are playing a game. A chair is being used as a castle, a small carpet under the chair is the castle moat, and stuffed animals are dragons and knights. Suppose one child moves the “dragon” into the “moat” and attacks the “castle,” prompting the other to announce a new rule for the game: “The dragon’s fire goes out when the dragon gets wet.” The first child will infer that the dragon can’t breathe fire now. The inference holds for the fictional world of their game of make-believe, but it also rests on believing that moats contain water, which makes things wet.<sup>19</sup> Although the toy isn’t a real dragon and there’s no real water, the child manipulating the dragon is not playing by the rules of the game if she holds out the stuffed toy and answers, “But my dragon is dry. Just feel it!” In constructing a successful make-believe, both children understand that the dryness of the physical toy is irrelevant. If they are imagining that the dragon went into the moat, then it is appropriate to infer and thus imagine that the dragon is wet and, from that, the absence of fire to attack the castle—but these things are only to be “believed” within the confines of the make-believe. Once nondoxastic processing gets underway, it obeys the logic that governs ordinary belief formation.

For purposes of my analysis of music, it is vital to note that the example does not assume that the children construct mental images to supplement their observation of the

toys. When a game of make-believe utilizes physical props, supplementary mental images are largely superfluous. The important thing is that both children observe the same props and make the same inferences from the same information, some of which is true and some of which is only fictionally true. Responding to the claim that the dragon's fire is extinguished, a clever child might stay within the implicit rules by replying, "The moat is empty" or, better yet, "Okay, an hour has passed and the dragon is dry." Neither child believes there is a real dragon and moat, nor that a real hour has passed, yet their imaginings exploit the same inference rules that govern ordinary beliefs about real life. Based on what has gone on already, fictitious beliefs have boundaries and implications. These implications can include the realm of affective response. Fictitious beliefs can engage emotion more or less as real situations do. The children can become genuinely emotional about events in the world of the game.

The children's game is a fiction built up out of the combination of toys (real physical things!) and rules of play, constrained by beliefs about how the world operates. To imagine successfully, the children must "isolate or quarantine" many beliefs and desires.<sup>20</sup> There are two views of what this involves. Consider watching a film. We do not "imagine" a set of mental images to supplement those we already get from the movie screen. Instead, to imagine while watching a film is to set aside what we are really doing, watching images on a screen, in order to treat the images as fictionally true and to construct additional fictional truths from them.<sup>21</sup> A useful formulation of this point describes it in terms of a "double representation system," making the point that we supplement representations of our lived environment with a second, parallel system, which operates just like the first except that it does not guide action.<sup>22</sup> Hence, when props



and other external events guide our imaginative cognition, we track selected aspect of our environment, form appropriate beliefs about that environment, and continuously introduce the relevant beliefs into the parallel system of nondoxastic cognitive processing in order to continuously generate new nondoxastic cognition.

To show that this minimal account of imagining is essential to music listening, we need something musically analogous to the visual props for narrative make-believe. I have already noted that one way to do this is to argue that the experience of some expressive qualities involves imagining that the music is a person, or that expressive language is used metaphorically. Like my stories about the milk and the dragon getting wet, this approach regards narrative pretense as the key to imagination. However, there is so much controversy about how we perceive music's expressive properties that sorting it out would be the long way to show that some aesthetic properties are uncovered by imagining. We can get there by a shorter route.

Take any case of being surprised when music deviates from how we imagine it will go. As Walton observes, some of these cases involve imaginings "about elements of the music itself."<sup>23</sup> One of the classic examples is the second movement of Haydn's Symphony No. 94, aptly nick-named the *Surprise Symphony*. When the slow movement reaches the end of its initial section, the music repeats again from the beginning, but more softly and with sparser instrumentation. For eight bars the music proceeds as it did before, and then there is a very loud chord accompanied by a timpani stroke. (So the symphony is known, among German speakers, as *Mit Dem Paukenschlag* or "with the drum-stroke.") According to one musicologist, the crash of sound "comes without warning ... as an assault on the nervous system." Those who hear the symphony

experience a “betrayal of expectation,” leaving them in “lingering suspense” about subsequent disruptions.<sup>24</sup> However, describing it as “an assault on the nervous system” makes it sound entirely pathological and without connection to our cognitive processing. I propose that novice listeners quickly anticipate the parameters of the upcoming musical movement in Haydn’s Andante, and then when the *Paukenschlag* violates those expectations, they form new expectations, and then those are again violated when nothing else happens. Turing back to the musicologist’s analysis, we’d then say that those who’ve experienced the music several times or otherwise know precisely where the disruption occurs can appreciate Haydn’s ingenuity and can enjoy watching the shock of the uninitiated.

For my argument, the important case is the not the novice listener. It is the listener who finds the *Paukenschlag* disruptive even though she anticipates it. There is no literal betrayal of expectation. Yet don’t those “in the know” also experience some kind of betrayal? I certainly do. But if we perceive the disruptive force of the timpani and *fortissimo* chord even when we anticipate it, then the aesthetic property must be appreciated by *imagining* the slow movement without it. For if the musical “joke” merely confirms the expectations of the informed listener, there can be no experience of disruption. However, if our sense of musical motion is nondoxastic and yet is informed by what we actually hear (i.e., our doxastic response shapes our nondoxastic inferences and anticipations), then nondoxastic cognition will experience betrayal with the *Paukenschlag* even when we are fully aware that it will occur.

There is nothing special about the Haydn example. Musicologist Marion Guck analyzes why she is always “startled” by the D-major chord in measure 8 of the Adagio

of Mozart's A-Major Piano Concerto (K. 488). She anticipates the chord, yet Mozart's success in presenting a "ground-shifting ... stretch of music" always has the same startling quality.<sup>25</sup> Edward T. Cone discusses the suspenseful quality of Brahms' Intermezzo No. 1 (Op. 118). How can we experience suspense about what the tonic is after we have heard the music performed several times? We *know* what it is. Cone points in the right direction, citing narrative theory and children's games, but he postulates a controlling persona, which listeners may or many not imagine.<sup>26</sup> My point is that we do not need to simulate anything so elaborate. It is enough that our normal mental processing controls our nondoxastic thinking, shaping our imaginative anticipations.

Consider two non-musical examples of betrayed imaginative processing. With narrative film, the order in which information is provided can establish and then betray nondoxastic inferences without our having to imagine betrayal by a controlling persona. Watching the Denzel Washington film *Man on Fire*, we reach a point in the story where it is plausible to conclude that Dakota Fanning's character is dead. The film does not show her being killed, but the film offers overwhelming circumstantial evidence that she has been murdered. (Images of the grieving mother indicate that she believes her daughter is dead. A trusted friend reports the girls' death to the Denzel Washington character.) Some time later, we are told that the girl is still alive and then there are scenes that confirm that she was not murdered. However, because viewers have been repeatedly encouraged to infer that the character is dead, a fully justified inference within the fiction (that she is dead) is set into conflict with what is fictionally true (that she is alive). As so often happens with real life situations, a justified inference is a mistake. The film *The Sixth Sense* works in the same way, except that an inference that Bruce Willis' character

recovered from gunshots is eventually revealed to be the source of a great deal of misdirected cognitive processing. In being led astray within the fiction, it is irrelevant whether viewers supply mental images of either character's corpse. Non-imagistic nondoxastic cognition does the job.

On a first viewing of these two films, the plot twists depend on the careful, prominent placement of misleading cues and the audience's justified but erroneous "beliefs" about the film's fictional world. On a second viewing, most viewers anticipate the twists and enjoy watching how they get set up. Anticipating a plot twist, many people also enjoy watching other members of the audience "fall for it." Yet we can enjoy the same film more than once or twice, and can do so alone, or when aware that everyone else watching it has already seen it. So our pleasure at the twists is not an anticipation of the surprise of others. Or someone might own a favorite film and repeatedly watch it alone. Either way, the film still provides various shocks, tensions, and humor in moments that were originally unexpected. Yet we now expect them. Hence, we must be appreciating something besides our initial surprise and our subsequent response to the responses of "novices" in the audience.

If we subtract reference to a narrative "world" in which various inferences are fictionally true and false,<sup>27</sup> Haydn's *Surprise Symphony* works the same way. The slow movement follows composition rules that invite us to think it will conform closely to the musical structure already heard. First-time listeners experience genuine surprise and consternation when it turns out that the music contains an unprepared disruption. It's also true that listeners "in the know" will anticipate it and will enjoy watching how others respond. But I again remind you of the important point. Even if I know that the disruption

will occur and anticipate it, it remains aesthetically disruptive. Nothing in the music points toward it. Listeners who understand the musical category of late eighteenth-century symphonies will recognize that the *Paukenschlag* should not occur.<sup>28</sup> If we return to my example of the children with the toy dragon, Haydn's insertion of the *Paukenschlag* is like one child agreeing that the dragon is wet and agreeing that wet dragons don't breathe fire, then insisting that *this* dragon doesn't obey the rules governing dragons. Or, in the context of the gritty realism of *Man on Fire*, suppose the film suddenly explained the character's being alive by asserting that the child died and was resurrected from the dead, without otherwise allowing any supernatural elements into the plot! The rules of the game—what George Grove called being “accustomed to the regular processes of the time”<sup>29</sup>—tell us that this should not happen.

With fictional narrative, nondoxastic inferences are constrained by ordinary belief about cause and effect as well as by knowledge of the relevant literary genre.<sup>30</sup> With absolute music, the relevant musical style provides a parallel, but less rich, cognitive scaffolding. Either way, nondoxastic inferences can be established and then violated. In the rich narrative world of fiction, major violations of the tacit logic of the fictional world invite disgust, not amusement and admiration.

However, instrumental symphonic movements do not present us with the narrative richness of a film, and if Haydn's music can violate our expectations when we rehear it, notice how this must work. We may, on a second hearing, anticipate the *Paukenschlag* as a real feature of the music. We expect it to happen, and perhaps we know precisely when. (Perhaps we're following the score.) But if Haydn's music has an aesthetic property of aggressive interruption even for those who expect it, then our

musical anticipations are not confined to our actual beliefs about what the music will really do. Listening must also include imaginative inference and anticipation based on the standard “behavior” of this sort of music. Knowing that the *Paukenschlag* is about to happen—that there will really be a big burst of sound—does not stop us from imagining that Haydn’s music will continue on its placid journey.

Remember, knowing that the physical toy dragon is dry does not determine that the fictional dragon is dry. Knowing that I’m watching projected light in a cinema does not stop me from imagining that a little girl has died, even as I believe that the real person, the actress, is alive. So knowing what I *will* hear does not prevent me from imagining something else. Imagination requires a partitioning and parallel processing of information, enabling us to follow and compare two lines of inference. The audience forms beliefs about what is actually happening (the toy is moved to the chair), and the “simulated” or pretend scenario incorporates relevant new information from the real-world props (the dragon flies to the castle). Likewise, the listener knows that the *Paukenschlag* is coming, but in the distinct cognitive processing of imagination, there is no information to warrant that expectation. Understood to be nondoxastic inferences fed by occurrent perceptual information, our knowledge that the music will deviate from what’s expected (based on perception and inferences grounded in our knowledge of musical style) is independent of our nondoxastic expectations. Hearing the succession of tones as musical motion, we imagine that motion and we cannot control our independent inferences about where this imagined motion is heading.

Hearing the sounds as moving tones is our additional evidence that imaginative processing takes place when listening, for this is the point at which “imagination invades

the perception itself.”<sup>31</sup> The parallel phenomenon of “seeing-in” is much discussed. The general consensus is that seeing an object in a picture does not require perceptual illusion. As Currie puts it, “Seeing-in seems to be fast, mandatory, encapsulated, very little dependent on learning, and subject to characteristic impairment.”<sup>32</sup> Seeing a woman in a pencil drawing, one involuntarily thinks of a woman, but one need not believe that one is looking at a woman. The visual design involuntarily engages our nondoxastic cognition. In short, imagination is engaged. I am proposing that a parallel engagement holds for auditory perception: hearing-in is no less imaginative than seeing-in, and both are cases of nondoxastic non-imagistic cognition.

Hence, the cognitive processing account of imagination tells us that the same sounds are separately “run” through two different yet isomorphic cognitive processes. There is doxastic inference, resulting in beliefs, and then there is imaginative processing, which result in nondoxastic inference.<sup>33</sup> Thus, a listener who knows the music or who follows the score can anticipate the coming disruption, literally *believing* it will happen, while simultaneously failing to anticipate it in the nondoxastic processing that tracks and anticipates motion in musical space. Neither Haydn’s general musical style nor the particular pattern of musical motion in the *Andante* provides information to listeners that will generate nondoxastic cognition of its looming occurrence. This partitioning forces a listener who follows the slow movement up to that point to anticipate the “fictional” music’s uninterrupted continuation of the imagined motion. Paradoxically, many musical properties are only perceived in the sounds because we are already actively engaged with perceiving-in. We therefore experience surprise, confusion, and delight when the actual sounds do not correspond to our warranted nondoxastic expectations. In the same way

that the children in the toy dragon example felt emotions toward events in the imagined world, almost everyone experiences emotion toward what they simulate. So the disruption of the simulated music creates surprise, and it can do so even if the appearance of the anticipated *Paukenschlag* generates some measure of satisfaction in the same listener.

Therefore, it is likely that imagination is at work whenever someone appreciates aesthetic properties created when the actual sounds deviate from pretense expectations justifiably derived from its standard features. If we give up the standard presumption that imagining requires mental images, we find imagining at work in our listening whenever we encounter creativity (something beyond novelty) relative to the stylistic cues. In such cases, we are justified in responding to music by saying, “I’m surprised that the music is doing this.” This response is also warranted when there is no real surprise, for we know what the music will do. So the activity of imagining is a constant companion to understanding when we rehear creativity in music.

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<sup>1</sup> Gregory Currie, “Anne Brontë and the Uses of Imagination,” in *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*, ed. Matthew Kieran (Blackwell, 2004), 209-21.

One can readily confirm Currie’s claim by noting the topic’s complete absence from Noël Carroll, ed., *Theories of Art Today* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000).

<sup>2</sup> Robert Stecker, *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An Introduction* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), and Stephen Davies, *The Philosophy of Art* (Blackwell, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> Over-emphasis on narrative fiction sometimes encourages recourse to what is often



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dubbed the “theory theory” of imaginative processing, in which our “ability to explain behavior in terms of underlying states of mind” is cited as the core cognitive ability involved in responding to fictional literature; Lisa Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006), 4.

Also known as the “mind reading” hypothesis, this theory postulates complex capacities for metarepresentation in young children as a condition for their engaging in imaginative pretence. For this and other shortcomings of this approach, see Gregory Currie, *Arts and Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 191-205.

<sup>4</sup> Consider the titles of Copland, *Music and Imagination* (Harvard University Press, 1952), and Nicholas Cook, *Music, Imagination, and Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1990).

<sup>5</sup> The topic of imagination is notably absent from recent scientific accounts of musical experience, e.g., Daniel J. Levitin, *This is Your Brain on Music: The Science of a Human Obsession* (New York: Dutton, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Kendall Walton, “Listening With Imagination: Is Music Representational,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 52:1 (1994), 47-61, and Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

<sup>7</sup> Hanslick, *Musically Beautiful*, 64.

<sup>8</sup> Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), 29 (emphasis added).

<sup>9</sup> Scruton, *Aesthetics of Music*, 239. Several recent responses to Scruton have argued that the perception of musical structure does not necessarily involve the concept of space, but

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nothing in my analysis depends on the necessity of imagining tones as points in space.

See Malcolm Budd, “Musical Movement and Aesthetic Metaphors,” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 43 (July 2003): 209-223. Budd also contends that “it is literally true that a melody moves up and down” (220), but Farael De Clercq rightly replies our perception of melodic movement does not demonstrate that anything literally moves (“Melody and Meaphorical Movement,” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 47 (April 2007): 156-68).

<sup>10</sup> Roger Sessions, *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer and Listener* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 70. See also Roger Sessions, *Questions About Music* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 51-52.

<sup>11</sup> This form of imagination is Copland’s primary interest in *Music and Imagination*.

<sup>12</sup> Ned Rorem, *Settling the Score* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988), 228.

<sup>13</sup> See Stephen Davies, *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 228-77.

<sup>14</sup> “Of what *instrumental music* cannot do, it ought never be said that *music* can do.” Hanslick, *Musically Beautiful*, 15.

<sup>15</sup> This model of nondoxastic cognitive imagining identifies it with simulating, but not necessarily with image simulation. For multiple perspectives on this topic, see Martin Davies and Tony Stone, eds., *Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995).

<sup>16</sup> “The core claim ... is that a mechanism that takes pretense representations as input will process those representations much as it would process isomorphic belief representation.” Shaun Nichols, “Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code,” *The Journal*

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of *Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 131.

<sup>17</sup> Although I formulated this argument before reading his work, Currie notes that it is an important fact about imagination that our imaginings can surprise us; Currie and Ravenscroft, *Recreative Minds*, 26.

<sup>18</sup> Gregory Currie, "Aesthetics and Cognitive Science," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 714.

<sup>19</sup> Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, "A Cognitive Theory of Pretense," *Cognition* 74 (2000): 124-25.

<sup>20</sup> Alvin I. Goldman, "Empathy, Mind, and Morals," in *Mental Simulation*, 190. One must "simulate counter-factual, hypothetical reality by setting aside what one knows about the world." Jacqueline D. Woolley, "Young Children's Understanding of Pretense and Other Fictional Mental States," in *Pretending and Imagination in Animals and Children*, ed. Robert W. Mitchell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 135.

<sup>21</sup> Gregory Currie, *Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 141-63.

<sup>22</sup> Jonathan M. Weinberg and Aaron Meskin, "Imagine That!," in Kieran, *Contemporary Debates*, 227.

<sup>23</sup> Walton, "Listening With Imagination," 48. Walton proposes that our imagining "fortuitous or accidental occurrences" in music's design should "count as representations" of "lateness, fortuitousness, etc." (51), but subsequently concedes that these features do not "establish" a fictional world, and so are better understood as imaginings without representation (59-60).

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<sup>24</sup> All of the quoted descriptions are from Gretchen A. Wheelock, *Haydn's Ingenious Jestings with Art: Contexts of Musical Wit and Humor* (New York: Schirmer, 1992), 16.

<sup>25</sup> Marion A. Guck, "Taking Notice: A Response to Kendall Walton," *The Journal of Musicology* 11, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 47.

<sup>26</sup> Edward T. Cone, *Music: A View from Delft* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 80-89.

<sup>27</sup> See Peter Lamarque, *Fictional Points of View* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 92-112.

<sup>28</sup> "Listeners invoke style structures that are implicatively relevant to the perceptual and cognitive analysis of input." Eugene Narmour, "Hierarchical Expectation and Musical Style," in *The Psychology of Music*, ed. Diana Deutsch, 2nd ed. (San Diego and London: Academic Press, 1999), 442.

<sup>29</sup> George Grove, *Beethoven and His Nine Symphonies*, 4.

<sup>30</sup> Weinberg and Meskin, "Imagine," 232.

<sup>31</sup> Currie and Ravenscorft, *Recreative Minds*, 29.

<sup>32</sup> Currie, *Arts and Minds*, 220.

<sup>33</sup> Our "emotional systems will respond to pretense representations much as they do to parallel beliefs." Nichols, "Imagining and Believing," 131. See also Weinberg and Meskin, "Imagine," 231.